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FOREWORD 
This paper appeared previously as an IIASA Working Paper, WP-87-94. The ideas in 
it have been evolving for several years. In fact some of the ideas discussed in this paper 
appeared in the original in-house proposal for the Computer Integrated Manufacturing 
(CIM) Project in 1985, and the author still contends that the growing complexity of 
manufacturing is one of the most powerful drivers of the worldwide trend towards com-
puterization in manufacturing. The ideas were further developed while the author was 
at IIASA from 1986-87. 
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'I'll is J>llJ>el' J>rese11t.~ so111r intrl'esting 111u/ IH' IV ideas obou.l tile 1wtu 1·e of llw fon;es driving the 
worl<lwide trend toward .f1e.rible oulo11111tio11.. It suggest.~. in brie,f: lll11t the dem1111.d .J(n· cmnpuler-
inlegraled in11rwji1ctu ri11 ,q (CIM) arises frnm what N11 1/111n Hasenberg has ter111e1l 11 "mismatch ... 
til11t is. 11 prublnn I/wt w11s create1l. in e.ffrcl. by trcl11wlo,qic11/ progress itsel,J: 111 ll1is case the 
"prnble111" is til11t <lefecls in 111111wfacl11rin.<J have becor11e intolemhlr. The reason for this is llwt 
<le'lluind .fi1I' lii.<Jliel' and l1i,ql1er /evel.s qf' 1n·o<luct perfonrwnce. over many decades. has reqttired 
o/'ders-o.f'.11111.<Jnitnde incl'r11ses in 111ecl111 nical comple.rity. on the one /1.11 nd. and lti.<Jhe l' precis·ion. 
on. the othel'. To sal'isflJ these /1iyh st1rnd11l'rls reqtt'ires a Le·vel of errol' control. tlwl increasingly 
precludes the use of lw.inan workers in direct contact ·with workpieces as they uwve through the 
rrw nufacturi ng syste111. 'I'll is p11pel' e.Tpl.o/'es four related hypotheses. 1is follows: 
• That the /11111'/lot "el'l'OI' l'ate" is inli e l'enlly large and ewinot be reduced to (or nearly to) zero 
even 11nder the most fovorable co11dilions. 
• Thal "lligh pe1:/orr1111ncr " in o prndncl tends to reqwire 11 h'igh degree of precision and 
complexity in the <le.sign and 11111nuf<1cluring process. This tendency can be seen most clearly 
over ti ll'le. 
• Tl111l defects can hr llw11,ql1l of 11.s lost i11Jonnalio11 (jiist ns erl'Ol'S in accounts 01· messages) 
and llwt e rrol'·detect'io11 11nd error-co/'rection techniqties fron1 comrnun·ications theory 1nay be 
11pp1·opriute tool.s for 11w 1urge111ent. 
• That defects c11n best be elirYl'inated i11 111wwfactnr1'.ng by ndopting the ''monol·ithic" concept 
that h1is bee 11 so successfu.l in electronics. 
I INTB.ODl'CTION 
A ccording to the poet Alexander Pope "to err is human; to forgive divine." This may be a truism in the moral sphere, but it is only half true in the production context. Modern manu-
facturing, in particular, is unforgiving of error. Exact 
figures are lacking, but a surprisingly large fraction of the 
cost of production is directly attributable either to the 
prevention of avoidable defects (e.g., quality control), their 
detection (e.g., inspection), or their elimination after the 
fact (repair, rework). Informal estimates from various 
sources suggest that quality control in all its ramifications 
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(design, inspection, scrap, rework, repair, and warranty) 
may account for 40% of total costs, or even more. The 
importance of this figure is doubled when one considers 
that roughly 50% of the sales dollar goes for purchased 
materials which also include a large quality cost compo-
nent. From another perspective, the celebrated Japanese 
superiority over the U .S. in manufacturing may stem 
largely from a longer established Japanese recognition of 
this problem, coupled with widespread commitment to 
ameliorate it. ' 
'Xerox Corp. offers an inleresting example. Recently Xerox announced 
wi th so me pride tha1 i1 s parts rejec1 rate is now down to 1.3 per 1000 (from 
© Copyright 1988 American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
2 THE INTRINSIC HF:\IAN ERROR PROHABILITY 
Ergonomists and human factors engineers have traditionally 
approached the "error" problem by "explaining" errors by 
machine operators in terms of poorly designed man-
machine interfaces. Their focus has been largely on 
redesigning this interface to increase system reliability. This 
is understandable and desirable, but it tends to obscure a 
key fact: that even with the best-designed man-machine 
interface, the probability of human error can not in 
practice be reduced to zero except, of course, by decreasing 
the rate of useful output to zero also. Among tht:: funda-
mental reasons why humans are inherently error-prone is 
the inability to maintain a permanent state of concentrated 
attention . Subconscious, autonomous processes are neces-
sary for the functioning of the organism. Heart and lung 
operation are only two examples . Limbs must move or 
twitch from time to time or they will cramp. Eyes must 
blink occasionally to maintain external lubrication, itches 
must be scratched, throats must be cleared, and so on. 
These biophysical functions occasionally interfere with con-
scious mental activities and cause lapses in attention. 
Factors that tend to increase the error-rate above the 
theoretical minimum rate are known to include: 
• emotional stress 
• physical strain and discomfort 
• interference (noise) 
• poor illumination 
• information load (overload) 
The influence of these factors on human performance 
and error rate is discussed in a number of ergonomics and 
human factors monographs and research reports, such as 
Meister [I, 2] and Swain and Guttmann [3]. 
The general relationship between information processed 
(input) and information transmitted (output) has been dis-
cussed extensively in the ergonomics and psychology litera-
ture, especially in the context of estimating maximum 
output rates. To summarize a great deal of ergonomic data 
in a few words (see reference [ 13] for a more extensive 
review), the amount of information "lost" -which is 
equivalent to the error rate-rises extremely sharply as the 
input rate approaches 10 bits/s. This can be interpreted, 
without straining the facts, as a straightforward problem of 
information overload, or saturation. The overload hypoth-
esis would seem to offer a partial explanation, at least, of 
the extremely high propensity of humans to make errors in 
emergency situations, noted by Swain and Guttmann [3]. 
More relevant to this paper, however , is the fact that there 
is apparently a minimum error rate for human workers, 
even under ideal conditions. 
8 per 1000 a few years ago). However, its Japan ese competitors have 
achieved reject rates less than I per 1000 (New York Times, Nov. 16, 1985). 
Since the early 1970's, when it s exclu sive patent protection exp ired, Xerox 's 
market share of the plain paper copier market has fallen to about 360/o 
while Japanese companies like Ricoh a nd Canon totally dominate the low-
cost segment of the market. A recent study of the room air co nditioner 
ind ustry fou nd even more startling differences: J apanese firm s achieved 
assembly line defect rates a lmost 70 times lower than U.S. firms , o n the 
average, while among U.S. firms there was a best-to-worst range of 7 per 
100 to 165 per 100. The best Japan ese producers achieved failure rates 
between 500 and 1000 times better than the wo rst U.S. producers 1121. 
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As a matter of historical interest, the major justifica-
tion for automatic computation from Charles Babbage's 
time onward, is the fact that mathematical tables computed 
by humans are notoriously full of errors (mostly of tran-
scription). According to one hi storian of computers, speak-
ing of Babbage's motivation: 
None of these tables could be trusted, and many 
an experiment was undermined when the scientist 
discovered an error in a table he had relied on. 
One writer of the time, Dionysius Lardner, discov-
ered that mistakes originally committed by 
European mathematicians in 1603 cropped up 200 
years later in Chinese manuscripts. Government 
tables used for accurate navigation had more than 
1100 errors and seve n folio pages of corrections. 
The corrections needed corrections (4, p. 23]. 
The problem only got worse, as mathematical tables were 
needed for more and more purposes . In the 1930s the 
Works Progress Admini stration (WPA) tabulated many 
mathematical functions (using people with hand calcula-
tors), but these tables were full of errors-mostly mistakes 
in copying. The tables were later recalculated by Howard 
Aiken's Mark I Electromechanical computer, to eliminate 
th ese errors [5]. Recent Department of Defense studies indi-
cate an average of I error per 30 manual data entries. By 
comparison, optical scanners reading bar codes make 1 
error per 3,000,000 entries [6]. Roughly speaking, elec-
tronics technology is now five orders of magnitude less 
error-prone than human workers. 
There is no experimental evidence, nor any theoretical 
reason, to suppose that the human error probability (HEP) 
can ever be reduced to zero (or even very close to zero) in 
any practical case. Indeed, Meist e r himself remarks that 
"errors are inevitable unless thare are no tolerance limits" 
[9] . In repetitive jobs involving simple deci sions of the 
yes / no type the minimum (HEP) appears to be of the order 
of IO 1 .ln other words, the error rate generally exceeds I 
per 1000 opportunities. ' HEP may be much greater if 
working conditions are not ideal. However, further explor-
ing of the relationships between various as pects of working 
conditions and HEP will not be done. It is, however, 
worthwhile to recall that experiments show that the error 
rate begins to rise rapidly as information output 
approaches about 8 bits /s . To achieve a low HEP, other 
factors being favorable, the information processing load 
must be kept well below the workers' capacity-probably 
well below 2- 3 bits/s. 
:-l PRECISION, COMPLEXITY. AND PERFORMANCE 
With regard to the second hypothesis-that high perform-
ance demands precision and complexity-a few random 
examples will have to suffice to make the point, since no 
sc holar (to my knowledge) has ever explored the question 
in depth. Indeed, the proposition becomes almost self-
evident from the superficial examination of early machines. 
Invariably, they are quite simple and crude by comparison 
~ This number comes rrom a recent publication summari zing the litera-
ture [3]. An ear li er book by Swai n suggested the range 10 ' for HEP. 
Evident ly recent evidence tend s toward the larger figure. Howeve r , to be 
conse rva ti ve the lower figures should be considered as a remote possibility. 
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to their modern counterparts. One early weight-driven 
clock, for instance, used eight gear wheels, an escape 
wheel, a crank (three parts) a foliot balance (five parts), a 
verge (three parts), six axles, two pointer hands, a face 
plate, and various frame parts, pins, and so on [7]. Later 
versions introduced second-hands , adjustment mechanisms, 
self-winding mechanisms, chimes or alarms, calendars, 
jewel-bearings or ball-bearings, and so C'l. Surface toler-
ances for early clock parts were seldom better than I: I 00, 
and time-keeping accuracy was correspondingly low. By 
contrast, modern mass-produced electronic watches achieve 
time-keeping precision of the order of I: I 0' or even better. 
This level of performance obviously requires a correspond-
ingly high order of precision in the manufacturing process. 
Tools provide another illustration. Early hand tools, 
such as hammers, tongs, or shears, typically involved two 
or three parts . A late 19th-century hand-drill (brace and 
bit) with a chuck accommodating various drill bit diameters 
involved 20 parts. A push-type reversible hand-held screw-
driver with an adjustable chuck utilized '.10 or more parts. 
The addition of an electric drive motor would , of course, 
add another 50 or so parts. A handsaw had 3 to 5 part s. A 
motor-driven chain saw of current vintage has several hun-
dred parts, excluding the motor. Moreover, each of these 
parts is made with a level of precision in terms of composi-
tion and surface finish far beyond the capabilities of 19th-
century manufacturers. 
Vehicles provide the clearest evidence of the trend 
toward precision combined with complexity. Horse-drawn 
taxicabs of the mid-19th century consisted of a springless 
chassis with an enclosed body for the passengers; two doors 
and a simple bench for the driver, two iron axles; solid 
iron sleeve-type bearings; four relatively simple spoked 
wheels; and tiller-type of steering mechanism. The wheels 
were already moderately sophisticated, with 8 to 12 spokes 
and steel rims. The introduction of the safety bicycle in 
1885 brought a quantum leap in several areas, including the 
lightweight wheel, gearshift, chain-sprocket drive, and ball-
bearings. Each of these devices is highly complex . Thus an 
1885 Rover safety bicycle required more than 500 
individual parts. 
The earliest motorized vehicles (the 1886 Benz) added a 
small one-cylinder gasoline engine with a chain and 
sprocket drive mechanisms to a three-wheeled carriage 
using bicycle wheels. ' Benz's one-cylinder engine was a 
direct adaptation of Otto's successful spark-ignition gas 
engine (1876) for gasoline. In 1893 Maybach invented the 
carburetor. The steering wheel replaced the tiller after 1901 
and the steering knuckle followed in I 902 . Differential 
gears were introduced to allow the rear wheels to turn at 
different speeds. 
Other features adding greater convenience, power or 
ability-at the price of added complexity-included the 
pneumatic tire (now a very complex product in itself); 
springs and shock absorbers; multicylinder engines ; the 
electri c self-starter; acetylene headlamps followed by electric 
headlights; batteries; dashboard instruments; more controls-
such as the throttles and chokes-water cooling; forced 
'One later simplification was the introduction o f pressed solid metal 
wheels, in place of complex bicycle type wheels. Thi s became possible 
because of the development of new met a l-wo rking processes. 
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feed lubrication; mechanically operated valves; magneto's 
(later generators and alternators); hydraulic brakes; 
synchromesh transmission (1914), later followed by auto-
matic transmission; safety glass; power brakes; power steer-
ing; radio; air conditioning; emission controls; and so on . 
In fact , the modern car is a relatively complex piece of 
machinery, involving as many as 30,000 component parts . 
Of these, only a few percent are actually manufactured by 
auto companies themselves.' As many as 30% of the total 
number are electrical or electronic, and this percent is rising 
rapidly . Most parts have at least three distinct surfaces, 
while many parts (including threaded connectors) have 8 to 
10 surfaces. A few parts, such as gear-wheels, pistons, 
crankshafts, and camshafts, have a large number of sur-
faces. Thus a car probably has 60,000 to 80,000 distinct 
oriented surfaces. 
Yet autos are relatively simple compared to aircraft, 
helicopters, diesel-electric locomotives, transfer lines, elec-
tric generating plants, computers , and other capital goods. 
A large steam turbine involves 350,000 parts. A Boeing 747 
includes roughly 3.5 million parts . The space shuttle is 
probably the apogee of"mechanical complexity (with unfor-
tunate consequences); it probably involves on the order of 
I 0 million individual parts. See Fig . I. 
Quite apart from the large number of distinct parts in 
a complex modern product, a manufacturer today typically 
offers a large number of different models of each basic 
item. For example, Westinghouse Electric Co. manufactures 
over 50,000 different steam turbine blade shapes alone. A 
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HG. I. Major U.S. durable goods industries (Source: 
Nagayama and Funk, 1985 [8]) 
' Yinuall y all of 1he simple pa rt s (bea rin gs, pi s1ons, rings, and 
fas teners) are purchased , as well as mos1 elec1rical parts, rubber, glass and 
many complex subassemblies such as bra kes , transmi ss ion , hydraulics, and 
emi ssion control s. 
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major electrical connector manufacturer (AMP) produces 
80,000 different connector models. The IBM SelectricT" 
typewriter (with 2700 parts) could be made in 55,000 differ-
ent models. 
4 THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEE~ CO.MPLEXITY, 
ERRORS, AND DEFECTS 
It is axiomatic among industrial engineers that 
product defects, failures, and accidents are 
invariably the result of human error ... Since 
the worker is merely part of the production 
system , which has been consciously and 
deliberately designed, it stands to reason 
that those who designed the system are 
responsible for any inadequacies occurring 
in it. [9] 
This view, of course, put enormous emphasis on human 
factors and on systems engineering. The role of human 
factors engineering is undoubtedly important and often 
underrated. Indeed, HEP for a given activity in a given 
situation can often be sharply reduced from current levels, 
at modest cost, by eliminating certain factors that tend to 
increase errors . On the other hand, the claim "that errors 
can always be eliminated by better systems design " [9] is 
not scientifically justified, except in the special case where 
human workers are eliminated. The basic reason is that the 
human worker himself is not subject to redesign. Hence 
any system involving human workers is inherently subject 
to human limitations. 
Of course, many errors in manufacturing are caught 
by multilayer inspect ion systems. An average human-based 
system will catch and eliminate 70-80% of the defects per 
inspection. With a hierarchy of several inspection systems, 
the probability of a defect being undetected can be reduced 
to perhaps 2 in 100, giving a theoretically achievable final 
rate (for defects embodied in the product) of the order of 
10 '. Of course, this is very low compared with the current 
defect rate of 10 ' to 10 ' . Nevertheless, it is not low 
enough, as will be seen . 
Also, it must be recogni zed that, because of design 
redundancies and other factors, most (70-800Jo) defects do 
not matter much. For instance, spot welders in auto body 
plants are expected to make a certain number of bad welds. 
To compensate for this, designers simply provide for more 
welds than would otherwise be necessary. (Robot welders 
are more reliable than human workers and plants using 
robots can design for about 1 OOJo fewer welds). Hence the 
critical defect rate would be somewhat lower than the basic 
defect rate. 
All things cons idered, it seems possible that critical 
undetected defect rates might be reduced to the order of 
10 ' (0.0001) or perhaps even 10 '(0.00000 1) . But these 
rates are hypothetical. They are far lower than actual cur-
rent industrial performance. (A "good" reject rate today is 
around 0.1 OJo or 1 per 1000). Nevertheless the costs of over-
design (or "gold-plating"),' multiple layers of inspection, 
debugging, rework, maintenance and, above all, the heavy 
'The high costs associated with overdesign are particularly ev ident in 
military procurement. So-called military specifications (or mil specs) typica ll y 
lead to unit costs from 10 to 100 times greater than comparable product s 
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costs associated with catastrophic parts failures that occur 
after a product is in service make human errors increasingly 
intolerable in manufacturing. The direct cost of error con-
trol (e.g . inspection) is only the tip of the iceberg. When 
the bureaucratic structures and accounting procedures made 
necessary by the tendency of humans to err are also consid-
ered, the "real" cost of error control in a modern 
manufacturing firm may be much higher. This problem is 
particularly burdensome where high levels of product per-
formance are desired, requiring high degrees of complexity 
in the product design, or in mass production situations. 
According to Meister [9], a single large U.S. auto 
manufacturer provides about 3 billion opportunities for 
human error per day in assembly operations alone . Even in 
the most optimistic case, assuming a probability of 
undetected serious error of 1 per million opportunities an 
auto manufacturer would have to expect about 3000 serious 
undetected production flaws per day, or 1 in 3 cars. The 
actual number of assembly defects in autos is almost surely 
much larger under present conditions. In fact, consumer 
surveys have repeatedly noted, on the average, several 
defects per car, although most are minor. 
The dilemma faced by manufacturers of complex 
products can perhaps be understood more clearly from a 
simplified "model" of the production process. Suppose the 
final product involves components of N distinct part types, 
each of which involves a sequence of unit operations. The 
total number of actual operations involved is, therefore, 
M = L: nm ( 1) 
where n, is the number of components of the t"' part type 
and m, is the number of unit operations needed to produce 
the t"' part type. Each unit operation is an opportunity for 
error and a decision point where a hypothetical inspector 
makes a yes/ no decision. ("Yes" means the operation was 
carried out correctly, while "no" means it was not.) If the 
result of the inspection is positive ("yes") the workpiece 
presumably moves on to the next operation. If the results 
of the inspection are negative ("no") the workpiece is 
presumably rejected and discarded or divert ed into a 
"rework" line of some sort. 
Suppose the a-priori probability of error in the/" unit 
operation of the r"' branch (or part type) is known to be P,,· 
We can assume P,, is a small number, of the order of 10 '. 
Assuming perfectly reliable inspectors, the a-priori probability 
of a "yes" at the if" inspection point is (1 - P,). The 
probability of making one flawless component of the t"' 
type, with no parts rejections or need for rework is, 
therefore, 
m , 
u, I1 (1 - p,,] (2) 
designed for the civilia n market. Yet military hardware is notoriously 
unreliable. Thi s is surely attributable, in part, to the attempt to achieve 
maximum possible performance which, in turn, leads ro extraord inary com-
p lexity of design. On the other hand, military equipment is often made in 
small batches un suited for automation, thus simu ltan eous ly maximi zing 
opportunities for human error. 
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where u, is the probability of making the i'" part 
successfully. 
It follows that the probability u of manufacturing all 
the components flawlessly is 
v 
Tiu"• 
'I ' 
For purposes of argument, suppose that there is a lower 
limit on P,, , namely 
'Is P,, for all i, j 
It follows immediately that 
(I - P,,) < (I - l/) 
for all i, j and, therefore, the probability of achieving 
"zero defects" is bounded, viz. 
us n (! - .,,)"' .. " (I - '!) " 
where M is defined by equation (I). 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
Now equation (6) can be approximated in two dif-
ferent limiting cases, depending on the product M.,,, the 
number of "opportunities" for an error times the a priori 
probability of an error per opportunity. 
If M.,, > > I 
exp[M log (I - .,,)] 
expM(-.,, -Y2 .,, '. .. ) _ exp(-M'I) 
But if M.,, < < 
M.,, + 112M (M-1).,, ' 
_I - M.,, 
(7) 
(8) 
In other terms, if opportunity multiplied by probability of 
error significantly exceeds unity, the probability of achiev-
ing a product with zero defects (without many layers of 
inspections and rejections and much rework) is essentially 
zero. Consequently quality control and rework must 
inevitably constitute a large fraction of the costs of any 
complex product. Since inspection itself is subject to 
human error, complex systems manufactured, maintained, 
and operated by humans are statistically certain to fail with 
some regularity. (The reliability problems of the U.S. space 
shuttle illustrate this point perfectly). 
The production system can be regarded as a noisy 
channel of communication where the final product (or 
service) is, of course, the "message." Errors in manufac-
turing certainly constitute a kind of information loss or 
"noise," with humans themselves constituting the major 
source of noise in the system. The reduction or elimination 
of channel noise effectively adds useful information to the 
message. Since the number of inspection points (error 
possibilities) is defined as M (equation l ), it follows that 
the number of possible erroneous versions of the message is 
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2". Hence, the selection of or.e "correct" version requires 
exactly 
H = log, (2 ") = M 
bits of information per unit of final production. 
Taking a clue from communications engineering, there 
are two possible strategies for increasing the signal-to-noise 
ratio and ensuring correct transmission of the desired mes-
sage through a noisy channel. One strategy is to reduce the 
intrinsic noise level in the channel (e.g., by cooling it) . The 
other is to code the transmission in such a way as to 
increase redundancy . In fact, it is relatively easy to design 
codes to automatically reveal (i.e., detect) certain classes of 
common input/ output errors, such as transpositions. With 
slightly more sophistication, errors once detected can also 
be corrected automatically with a known (and fairly high) 
probability of success. 
Both of these strategies are applicable in manufactur-
ing. The first (noise reduction) strategy is primarily accom-
plished by removing humans from tool wielding and direct 
operational control over machines. Computers using solid-
state electronic circuitry are far more reliable than humans, 
in the sense that computers have an a priori probability of 
error per opportunity much lower than humans. The world-
wide trend toward automation can be regarded as an 
implementation of this strategy. The second (coding) 
strategy must be accomplished through product design. 
"Design for manufacturability" is nearly a cliche. How-
ever, just as coding can make many types of transmission 
errors self-revealing, many types of manufacturing errors 
reveal themselves automatically in the assembly stage. Of 
course, this is not a very clever solution. It is far more 
clever to weed out defects as soon as they occur in the 
process. Monitoring and screening devices of many kinds 
can be devised to react automatically to flaws of predicta-
ble types . It is part of the designer's function to facilitate 
easy error detection, if not to eliminate errors. 
G COMPLEXITY MEASURES AND COMPUTER-AIDED 
PROCESS PLANNING 
An attractive approach to computer-aided process planning 
(CAPP) is to select a discrete-part manufacturing process 
mainly in terms of four or five key product variables: the 
complexity of the product, the precision with which the 
product must be made, the lot or batch size, and the diver-
sity, or number of models in the "family." The physical 
size or dimension of the item is also a relevant variable . 
(This assumes that design and material choices are prespeci-
fied. See, however, reference [21].) Each of these variables 
affects the choice of manufacturing method, since labor, 
capital, and energy requirements differ among them. The 
greater the complexity of the product, in general, the 
greater the degree of automation required in the manufac-
turing process, to reduce the chances of machine operator 
error. The greater the precision required, again in general, 
the greater the degree of automation needed to reduce 
operator errors. The larger the lot or batch size (and the 
longer the expected life cycle), the less the degree of flexi-
bility required in the manufacturing process and the equip-
ment used. In fact, for a large enough manufacturing run, 
specially designed, single-purpose manufacturing machinery 
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can be justified. On the other hand, the greater the diver-
sity of models, the more flexibilit y is needed. In particular, 
where a family of parts is to be produced in moderate to 
small batches over many years, a flexible manufacturing 
system (FMS) will be indicated. 
Evidently, these four (or five) key product variables 
interact in a complex way. Experience demonstrates that 
the choice of manufacturing methods is not a simple one, 
even when the complexity of the product, the preci sion, the 
lot size, and the product diversity are known. There are 
important advantages to be gained from incorporating 
empirical knowledge of manufacturing processes into an 
expert system, and making the system available to 
manufacturing engineers and managers. 
It is perfectly clear that the costs of inputs (factors of 
production) determine the ultimate cost of the product. It 
follows that the optimum choice of technology depends, in 
principle, on these factors. One would expect some differ-
ences, for instance, between a high-wage country and a 
low-wage country. However, it is also clear that among the 
developed countries wage and capital costs are converging 
and technological choice in manufacturing is less and less 
strongly motivated by the differences that remain. 
Measures of precision (tolerances) with which the 
product must be made, and lot size are already familiar 
and easily measured parameters to the manufacturing 
engineer and manager. However, a useful measure of 
product complexity has hitherto not been available. For 
complete assemblies one might, perhaps, use a surrogate 
measure, such as the number of discrete parts. An example 
of this approach is illustrated in Fig. l. However, such a 
measure treats simple connectors and computer chips as if 
they were equivalent. In the mechanical sphere, there is a 
vast difference between the complexity (and cost) of "main 
Machining 
center 
parts" with many distinct surfaces vis-a-vis simpler ones. In 
actuality a small number of main parts accounts for some-
where in the neighborhood of half of all the value added in 
manufacturing (Fig. 2). Yet this is quite understandable in 
view of the fact that complex parts "embody" far more 
information than simple ones. In effect, information 
embodied in shapes is the logical measure of complexity. 
We propose to develop such a measure, since it is an 
important parameter in characterizing manufacturing 
processes. The complexity measure will be based on infor-
mation theory, and will in effect measure the minimum 
number of bit s or information needed to desc ribe a part. 
To consider how this might be clone, s uppose parts are 
class ified according to one of the standard group technol-
ogy sys tem s [ 14-20]. For example, in the Opitz five-digit 
system (Fig. 3) a plain hexagonal machine nut would have 
the classification 30500. In thi s case the fir st digit implies a 
rotational part with deviation, L I D :s 2; the second digit 
implies hexagonal overall shape; the third digit implies a 
rotational int ernal shape with screw thread s; the fourth 
digit implies flat (unstructured plane) surfaces; and the 
fifth digit implies no auxiliary holes or gear teeth. The 
specification of a classification of this sort obviously 
reduces uncertainty about poss ible shapes and therefore has 
information content. (For our purposes a five-digit sys tem 
is probably ample:) Of course, not all five-digit specifica-
tion s are equally probable, but if they were (recalling that 
information is defined as the logarithm of th e inverse prob-
ability of an event "coming true"), then the information 
content would be 
log , (10 ' ) 5 log , IO 
16 bits 
Share of total part number (%) 
FIG. 2. Group technology and manufacturing systems 
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Where a given classification is more probable than the 
average (as in the case of the hex nut) the information 
content of the specification would be somewhat less than 
16 bits; and conversely, an improbable specification would 
have greater information value. Thus, for greater precision 
it wou ld be necessary to estimate the a priori probabil ities 
of each Opitz (or other) classification. This is, clearly, a 
task for empirical research. 
In add ition to the purely geometrical classification, 
dimensional specificat ions add further information. For 
instance, specification of the internal screw threads in the 
nut would require three parameters, including depth and 
width of groove, and pitch (or incline) of the thread. Also, 
the thickness of the nut L, the external diameter D, or the 
length of the one edge of the hexagon, and the internal 
diameter d must be defined. Altogether, there are 6 
independent parameters, each of which can be assumed to 
correspond to 10 bits of information, (This assumes an 
accuracy of l part in 1000 or about 2 10 • Note that log, 
1000 = JO.) In add ition there is another bit of in formation 
to specify whether a screw is right- or left-handed, thus 
making a total of 61 bits. 
An important consequence of the concept of using 
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information theory to define the complexity of a prod uct is 
that assembly is seen to be an information-destroying 
process. Two parts that are to be assembled into a larger 
product will have two or more mating surfaces, each sur-
face requiring several parameters to specify it. When they 
are assembled, however, the final assemb ly requires fewer 
parameters to describe it than did the unassembled pieces. 
In particu lar, information about the mating surfaces in the 
interior of the final assembly is destroyed during the assem-
bly process. The use of information t heory to define part 
complexity leads to a conclusion already known, namely 
that assembly is an expensive way of prod ucing someth ing. 
The fact that manufacturing engineers and managers 
choose other ways, whenever possible, encourages one to 
believe that information theory provides a fruitful way of 
defining product complexity. 
7 ;\IANl' FAC"ITHING TE( 'H~OLO<JY DE('JSIO~ 
CHITEHIA 
One may suppose for purposes of discussion that the choice 
of manufacturing technology is made after the choice of 
design and materials is fixed. In reality, of course, the deci-
sion process is iterative, if not continuous. However, even 
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an iterative decision process can be broken up conceptually 
into distinct steps, taken ceteris paribus. 
With this simplification, the choice of technology will 
depend mainly on the following five major variables: 
• complexity 
• precision 
• batch size/ lot size/ run length 
• diversity 
• mass or linear dimension 
Complexity can be quantified, in principle, by the 
application of information-theoretic principles [IO]. In 
broad terms, complexity is a measure of the geometrical 
two- or three-dimensional information "embodied" in a 
component. For multi-component systems complexity is the 
sum of shape information in each component individually, 
plus the structural information needed to assemble them. 
Obviously, precision, batch-size, diversity, and mass are 
measurable in a straightforward way. 
In principle, the cost of production must depend on 
these variables, for a given capital and labor cost environ-
ment. With voluminous and reliable cost data for many 
specific products, a general cost function might be con-
structed econometrically. ' However, this has not been done, 
because it would be enormously expensive to gather the 
data even if firms were willing to release them . An indirect 
approach is therefore desirable. 
The first four variables-complexity, prec1s10n, batch 
size/ lot size and diversity-can be considered as defining a 
"manufacturing hypercube" in a properly chosen parame-
ter space. In different regions in the interior of that hyper-
cube, different manufacturing processes will generally be 
optimal. These regions will be separated by "switching sur-
faces," such that as one crosses a surface, the optimal 
manufacturing method switches from one process to 
another. In reality, of course, these surfaces may not be 
sharply defined. In principle, however, one can think of 
such switching as dividing the regions of the hypercube 
from one another. Each connected region in the interior of 
the hypercube will be divided from all other regions by a 
set of switching surfaces, and within a particular region, 
one would expect a specific manufacturing process to be 
optimal. Three "cuts" of the hypercube are illustrated 
in Fig . 4. 
The switching surfaces which separate different regions 
of the manufacturing hypercube amount to isotechnology 
frontiers . They are the loci of points having different com-
binations of complexity, precision, and lot size, but that 
are equivalent in that they represent the boundary between 
two regions . In other words, they are loci of points where 
the performance of two different manufacturing methods is 
equivalent and the choice between them is arbitrary. As 
already noted, the switching surfaces will not be sharply 
defined . There will, for example , be regional differences 
due to wage and capital cost differentials. Moreover, they 
will move, as technology evolves. The choice of the proper 
' A number of mo re specia li zed models have been proposed in the 
U.S., for example to minimize assembly cost (see reference (22]. or to 
j ust ify the use o f flexible manufacturin g system s (see references (23 and 24]) , 
or to j usti fy the use of ro botic assembl y (see references (25 and 26) . 
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FIG. 4. Three cuis across the manufacturing hypercube 
manufacturing process becomes a multicriterion decision 
task, taking into account several characteristics of the 
product and the manufacturing processes, including such 
mundane considerations as the fact that in a multiproduct 
environment the machinery for carrying out the "optimal" 
process may already be committed to some other higher-
priority task . Thus multicriteria decision procedures will be 
necessary to aid in choosing the manufacturing process 
which is optimal, not in some abstract sense, but in the 
concrete circumstances facing the plant manager. 
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8 COMPLEXITY AND MANUF ACTUlllNG: 
THE MONOLITHIC CONCEPT 
Until the 1960s, complexity of any machine could reason-
ably be measured in terms of its "parts count," the 
number of components from which it was made. The few 
exceptions (such as solid stamped or forged wheels replac-
ing spoked bicycle-type wheels) essentially prove the gener-
ality of the rule. This was as true for electrical machines as 
for mechanical devices. In 1958, J. A. Morton, vice presi-
dent of Bell Labs, wrote that scientists know in principle 
how to extend man's visual, tactile, and computational 
abilities by means of electronic circuitry, but that "such 
systems, because of their complex digital nature, require 
hundreds, thousands, and sometimes tens of thousands of 
electronic devices" [2]. Morton called this the "tyranny of 
numbers." He pointed out that each electconic circuit ele-
ment (resistor, capacitor, inductor, transistor, etc.) "must 
be made, tested, packed, shipped, unpacked, retested, and 
interconnected one-at-a-time to produce a whole system." 
Morton said, "The tyranny of large numbers sets up a 
numbers barrier to future advances if we must rely on 
individual discrete components." Indeed, a circuit with 
100,000 components could easily require 1,000,000 different 
soldered connections. The Control Data Corporation's 
CDC 1604 Computer (1959) had 25,000 transistors, 100,000 
diodes, and hundreds of thousands of resistors and capaci-
tors [27). A navy destroyer at the time had 350,000 district 
electronic components, with millions of soldered 
connections. 
This was the background for the monolithic revolu-
tion: the introduction of integrated circuits invented 
independently by J. Kilby of Texas Instruments Co., and 
Robert Noyce of Fairchild Semiconductor (1958-1959). 
. Since then, waves of microminiaturization have compressed 
more and more circuit elements onto a single semiconduc-
tor chip. The latest "chips" are almost unbelievable com-
plex devices electronically, but the complexity is embodied 
in compositional nonuniformities. A chip is built up of 
patterned layers of insulators, conductors, and semiconduc-
tors with carefully contrived properties. They are manufac-
tured, incidentally, by a kind of controlled growth process 
similar to the way a natural crystal grows: from the inside 
out. 
A similar trend in integration (to escape the "tyranny 
of numbers") is beginning to appear in the mechanical and 
electromechanical arena. For instance, early squirrel-cage 
induction motors (c. 1900) were assembled from a number 
of sheet-metal parts. Later, the number was sharply 
reduced by a new fabrication technique (centrifugal cast-
ing), which also cut the weight and permitted a much 
higher power/weight ratio. The modern stamped automo-
bile wheel, which replaced the earlier bicycle-type wheel 
assembled from many individual parts, constitutes another 
case in point. For a third example, the 1953 Garrett turbo-
charger required 182 parts. The 1982 version weighs 80% 
less, delivers twice the speed, and requires only 53 parts 
[I I]. More recently, the IBM dot-matrix printer introduced 
in 1985 involves only 60 parts, as compared to 150 parts 
for comparable units built only two years earlier. Much of 
IBM's reduction in parts number for the printer was 
achieved by using complex molded side frames to replace 
20 other parts. Motors twist and lock into place, eliminat-
ing four bolts, four nuts, and four washers each. This 
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greatly reduces the amount of assembly labor needed, as 
well as the probability of defects and need for inspection. 
Another recent example come,s from Black & Decker Mfg. 
Co., the world's leading producer of electric hand tools. A 
comprehensive redesign and simplification of the entire 
product line resulted in dramatic savings in manufacturing 
cost. 
One can scarcely escape the conclusion that the next 
generation of household appliances and automobiles will 
have many fewer mechanical parts than the present genera-
tion of such products. Just as integration of electronic cir-
cuitry involved "growing" complex chips by adding 
successive layers and materials with different properties, so 
the manufacture of integrated mechanical devices may pro-
ceed in the future. One can easily envision a monolithic 
chair, for instance, having rigid legs, springy seat and back, 
foam cushions, and a velour or leather-like surface, entirely 
manufactured by adding successive layers to a molded sub-
strate in a controlled fashion without any cutting or assem-
bly of pieces. If chairs, then why not desks, tables, sofas, 
and beds? Moving parts introduce difficulties, but not 
necessarily insuperable ones. Ultimately, the number of 
parts in a car might well drop into the low hundreds, as 
complex body and frame subassemblies are replaced by 
monolitljic molded substitutes. Henry Ford considered his 
major contribution to manufacturing to be the elimination 
of "fitters." The next major revolution in manufacturing 
may be the (gradual) elimination of assembly itself. 
To be sure, the manufacturing of monolithic mechani-
cal products analogous to the chip would likely entail very 
complex multistage processes, just as chip-making does. 
But increasingly sophisticated and predictable counterpres-
sure casting/molding techniques and isostatic powder metal-
lurgical techniques are beginning to find wider uses . 
Extensive pretesting can reduce intrinsic defect rates to 
almost arbitrarily low levels. A flaw once detected in the 
manufacturing system itself is eliminated forever. Down-
stream inspection will largely be done by computer-assisted 
microscopy and thermography. A final bit of speculation: 
Man will not fully conquer space until monolithic construc-
tion techniques are adopted for spaceships. Until then, 
operational reliability will remain an elusive dream. l\R 
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